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1 Introduction
Much analysis has been recently devoted in the contract literature to economies in
which each agent observes a signal about other agents’ private information. This
toghether with correlation among agents’ outputs may be used to design information
extraction mechanisms. In some cases it can be shown that the optimal contract
implements full information extraction, and hence the incentive constrained optimum
coincides with the Pareto optimum.
We study the robustness of information extraction mechanism with respect to
economies in which ‘exclusive’ contracts cannot be implemented. By this we mean
situations in which a ‘principal’ or a financial intermediary cannot observe, monitor or
contract upon all the contractual relationships an agent may enter with other interme-
diaries or agents. This is a very plausible situation if we think of informal or implicit
contracts that are not in general publicly observable. In a previous paper (Bisin and
Guaitoli 1998) we analyzed equilibria with moral hazard and financial intermediaries
competing in a ‘non-exclusivity’ environment, showing that equilibria are never second
best efficient and very often fail to implement the optimal action. It is interesting to
ask, therefore, whether information extraction in groups of agents may overcome the
serious inefficiency generated by non-exclusivity.
The simplest environment to pursue this analysis consists of an hidden action econ-
omy in which: i) agents are organized in pre-specified groups of two individuals (e.g. a
firm); ii) the outputs of agents in the same group are correlated; iii) agents in any group
perfectly observe each other effort. The incentive problem consists in extracting from
any agent information about the effort of the other agent in his group (which only he
observes). This must be done via contracts contingent on the observable realizations
of both agents and their reports.
In such environments we can show that full information extraction is never sus-
tainable at an equilibrium with non-exclusivity, while information is fully extracted at
the incentive constrained optimum, which for these economies coincides with the (first
best) Pareto optimum.
A contract which fully extracts information in an economy as above described can
be constructed as follows. Suppose the contract designer can ask each agent to send
a message about the effort of the other agent in his group. If contract payoffs can be
found so that each agent has an incentive to tell the truth (i.e. to report low effort
on the other agent if and only if he actually observed low effort, and viceversa for
high effort), then full information is extracted and contracts can be effectively made
contingent on effort for each agents (indirectly via the other agent’s message). Each
agent will then choose the Pareto optimal effort as if his effort were publicly observed.
Note that rewards for the truthful reporting of the low action of the other agent in the
group are never paid by the intermediary in equilibrium since both agents choose the
high effort. Finally, a contract with payoffs that guarantee truth telling in the agents’
message game can be found provided the outcome of each agent depends enough from
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the other agent’s effort as well as from its own.
The contract which implements full extraction just described is not sustainable
though in equilibrium if it cannot be effectively made exclusive. The argument is as
follows. Suppose an intermediary issued this contract. Then there exists a contract (the
‘deviating’ contract) that acts as a pre-commitment on the part of both agents never to
report the other’s low effort. By entering both this contract and the (full information
extraction) optimal contract agents are able to choose the low effort (without being
caught), and hence to enjoy full insurance at a (better than fair) price, while saving on
the effort cost. As a consequence the ‘deviating’ contract makes non-negative profits,
while the (full information extraction) optimal contract makes negative profits.
The ‘deviating’ contract is constructed essentially to insure an agent against the
possibility of being reported (by the other agent) as having chosen low effort, and to
punish an agent for revealing the low effort choice of the other. This type of con-
tracts looks like a social norm which punishes for ‘informing’ on the other members
of the group, independently of their actions. These forms of social norms fit quite
well with non-exclusivity environments (since obviously the adoption of a norm is very
difficult to monitor), and are quite common e.g. among extended family members,
among members of various social, religious or intellectual groups, etc.. We argue there-
fore that social norms could be studied as implicit, informal contracts in environment
characterized by non-exclusivity.
Within the related literature, we refer in particular to Ma (1988), where he suggests
a mechanism to implement the first best in a similar economy. Our first proposition
replicates his conclusion but through a different mechanism, providing therefore a dif-
ferent proof of the result. For the non-exclusive case, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990)
discuss the consequences of unregulated trade among agents but in a context where
agents collude and choose jointly their effort as a syndicate. What we have in our
model is not collusion, but non-cooperative Nash equilibrium choices of both effort
and ‘side-contracts’.
2 The economy
More specifically the economy we study is as follows. It is a hidden action economy
which lasts two periods, t ∈ {0, 1}; agents’ preferences value consumption in period 1
only: u1(c1)− v(e); and effort is private information. Also, effort can take two values,
e ∈ {a, b}, with v(a) > v(b). Agent i’s endowment wi1 takes values wH , wL, with
wH > wL. Agents are grouped in couples (i, X(i)) (X is a one-to-one and onto map
1).
The probability distribution of agent i’s endowment is affected by both i’s and X(i)’s
effort: piei,eX(i)(s
i), for si ∈ {H, L}. We denote with pie,e′ = pie,e′(H) the probability
that agent i has the high endowment H, given that he chose effort e and X(i) choose
effort e′ (note that pie,e′ refers to agent i’s probability, even though the index i does
1Agent i and X(i) are symmetric. For simplicity we report the notation only for agent i.
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not appear in the notation). Agent i receives a private information signal which fully
reveals eX(i) (and symmetrically for agent X(i)). Agent i then sends a message mi
with value in {a, b} about eX(i) (and symmetrically for agent X(i)). Finally, contract
j’s payoff to agent i is denoted dj = {dj
H,mi,mX(i)
, dj
L,mi,mX(i)
}. Note that contracts only
pay off in period 1 (since agents only consume in period 1) and depend on agents’
messages regarding their partner’s effort.2
3 Information extraction
We are now ready to characterize the incentive constrained optimum for the information
extraction economy when exclusive contracts can be implemented.
Proposition 1 In the information extraction economy with exclusivity, assume
(1− piaa)
piaa
<
(1− piba)
piba
<
(1− piab)
piab
<
(1− pibb)
pibb
. (1)
Then the incentive constrained optimal allocation is unique and achieves the Pareto
optimum:
cH = cL = piEwH + (1− piE)wL
where E ∈ {a, b} is the effort choice at the Pareto optimum.
Proof. See Appendix.3
The contracts {dsE}s∈S, E∈{a,b}2 which implement the Pareto optimum must extract
information on ei from X(i), for any i ∈ I; hence the dependence of the contract payoff
on the messages is non trivial: ds,E 6= ds,E′, ∀s ∈ {H, L}, E, E
′ ∈ {a, b}2.
The proof of Proposition 1 constructs a contract which implements full information
extraction (the only non-trivial case is when at the Pareto optimum both agent choose
the high effort, E = (a, a)). This contract has the property that it rewards agent i
for truthfully reporting agent X(i)’s low effort (and viceversa). In equilibrium then
full information is extracted and, as a consequence, agents choose the high effort and
are provided with full insurance contracts at fair price, (1 − piaa)/piaa. Condition (1)
guarantees that a contract which pays agent i a positive amount in expected value
2In general payoffs should be allowed to depend also on the partner’s realized outcome, as in
‘relative performance evaluation’ models (cf. Hart-Holmstrom (1987)). Here we omit it for simplicity,
since (as we prove) it is not needed for the optimal contract to reach the first best (Proposition 1),
while it would not change qualitatively the main consequence of non-exclusivity, i.e. the impossibility
of full information extraction (Proposition 2).
3Ma (1988) shows that full information extraction is the unique Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the
optimal contract problem, allowing for general implementation mechanisms (e.g. sequential mech-
anisms). Proposition 1 is a stronger result because it proves Subgame Perfect Implementation via
simultaneous mechanisms (a subset of the mechanisms allowed in Ma (1988)).
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when X(i) has chosen the low effort, and a negative expected amount when X(i) has
chosen the high effort, does in fact exists. Moreover the reward for truthful reporting
the low action of the other agent in the group is never paid by the intermediary in
equilibrium since both agents choose the high effort.
4 Non-exclusive contracts
We now consider the information extraction economy when exclusivity cannot be im-
posed on contracts. This will be the case whenever the principal is unable to monitor
agents’ trades with other intermediaries or among themselves, or even when informa-
tion about such trades is not verifiable.
Proposition 2 shows though that there exists a contract (which we construct in the
proof) that acts as a pre-commitment on the part of both i and X(i) to never report
the other’s low effort. By entering both this contract and the incentive constrained
optimal contract agents are able to choose the low effort (without being caught), and
hence to enjoy full insurance at the (better than fair) price (1− piaa)/piaa, while saving
on the effort cost.
Referring to the contract which implements the Pareto optimum (cf. proof of
Proposition 1) as contract d, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 In the information extraction economy with non-exclusivity, assume
condition (1) and E = (a, a) at the Pareto optimum. There exists then a contract d′
such that if the set of contracts {d, d′} is issued:
• all agents buy both contracts
• all agents choose the low effort, i.e. (ei, eX(i)) = (b, b)
• each agent i reports the high effort for agent X(i) and viceversa, i.e. (mi, mX(i)) =
(a, a).
Proof. See Appendix.
Whenever contracts d and d′ are simultaneously issued, then, the intermediary
issuing the incentive constrained optimal contract d will make negative profits, while the
intermediary issuing contract d′ will make zero profits (d′ can obviously be perturbed
to generate small positive profits).
Contract d′ essentially insures agent i against the possibility that agent X(i) reveals
that he has chosen low effort, and punishes agent i for revealing the low effort choice
of X(i) (and viceversa).
It is also clear from the proof that contracts of the form of d′ can be constructed
to upset any base contract designed to extract information by agent i on agent X(i)’s
effort.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is by construction of an optimal contract d (we
concentrate on the only non-trivial case in which, at the Pareto optimum, E = (a, a)).
Take ds,a,a = d
FI
s , ∀s ∈ S, such that
wH + d
FI
H = wL + d
FI
L and pia,ad
FI
H + (1− pia,a)d
FI
L = 0
i.e. dFIs are the payoffs associated with the (full insurance) Pareto optimal contract.
Also take ds,a,b = d
FI
s − P , ds,b,a = d
FI
s + dˆs, ds,b,b = d
FI
s + dˆs − P , where dˆ = (dˆH , dˆL)
satisfies:
pia,au
i(wH + d
FI
H + dˆH) + (1− pia,a)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + dˆL) = U
FI − a,a
pia,bu
i(wH + d
FI
H + dˆH) + (1− pia,b)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + dˆL) = U
FI + a,b
pib,au
i(wH + d
FI
H + dˆH) + (1− pib,a)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + dˆL) = U
FI − b,a
pib,bu
i(wH + d
FI
H + dˆH) + (1− pib,b)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + dˆL) = U
FI + b,b
with hk > 0, h, k ∈ {a, b}; and U
FI = ui(wH + d
FI
H ) = u
i(wL + d
FI
L ). A sufficient
condition for dˆ to exist (i.e. for the equations above to be satisfied) is
(1− pia,a)
pia,a
<
(1− pib,a)
pib,a
<
(1− pia,b)
pia,b
<
(1− pib,b)
pib,b
(construct dˆ to have negative expected value if (e, e) = (a, a) or if (e, e) = (b, a), and
positive expected value if (e, e) = (a, b) or (e, e) = (b, b)). For dˆ small enough there
exist then ωhk > 0, h, k ∈ {a, b}, such that with messages (b, b)
pia,au
i(wH + d
FI
H + dˆH − P ) + (1− pia,a)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + dˆL − P ) = U
P − ωa,a
pia,bu
i(wH + d
FI
H + dˆH − P ) + (1− pia,b)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + dˆL − P ) = U
P + ωa,b
pib,au
i(wH + d
FI
H + dˆH − P ) + (1− pib,a)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + dˆL − P ) = U
P − ωb,a
pib,bu
i(wH + d
FI
H + dˆH − P ) + (1− pib,b)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + dˆL − P ) = U
P + ωb,b
with UP = ui(wH + d
FI
H − P ) = u
i(wL + d
FI
L − P ).
We do not need to impose market clearing conditions on dˆ since in equilibrium,
we will show that, given d, E = (ei, eX(i)) = (a, a). The game played by agents is
represented in Figure 1.
< Figure 1 >
The reader can check that, proceeding by backward induction, the unique Nash
Equilibria of the four simultaneous last-stage games (i.e. the message games) are
respectively
(a, a); (b, a); (a, b); (b, b).
We can then construct the first stage simultaneous game’s payoff matrix:
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< Figure 2 >
whose Nash Equilibrium is (ei, eX(i)) = (a, a), for P large enough. ♦
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by construction. Take a contract d′ as follows:
d′s,e,e′ = d˜s + d
′′
s,e,e′, with d˜s such that dˆs + d˜s = 0, ∀s. Also d
′′
s,e,e′ satisfies: d
′′
s,a,a =
d′′s,a,b = 0, and d
′′
s,b,a = d
′′
s,b,b = d
′′
s such that
pia,au
i(wH + d
FI
H + d
′′
H) + (1− pia,a)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + d
′′
L) = U
FI + δa,a
pia,bu
i(wH + d
FI
H + d
′′
H) + (1− pia,b)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + d
′′
L) = U
FI + δa,b
pib,au
i(wH + d
FI
H + d
′′
H) + (1− pib,a)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + d
′′
L) = U
FI + δb,a
pib,bu
i(wH + d
FI
H + d
′′
H) + (1− pib,b)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + d
′′
L) = U
FI − δb,b.
Again, such a contract d′′s exists if
(1− pia,a)
pia,a
<
(1− pib,a)
pib,a
<
(1− pia,b)
pia,b
<
(1− pib,b)
pib,b
.
Again, for d′′s small enough there exist γhk > 0, h, k ∈ {a, b}, such that
pia,au
i(wH + d
FI
H + d
′′
H − P ) + (1− pia,a)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + d
′′
L − P ) = U
P + γa,a
pia,bu
i(wH + d
FI
H + d
′′
H − P ) + (1− pia,b)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + d
′′
L − P ) = U
P + γa,b
pib,au
i(wH + d
FI
H + d
′′
H − P ) + (1− pib,a)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + d
′′
L − P ) = U
P + γb,a
pib,bu
i(wH + d
FI
H + d
′′
H − P ) + (1− pib,b)u
i(wL + d
FI
L + d
′′
L − P ) = U
P − γb,b.
We can then follow the steps of the proof of Proposition 1 to show the following. If
both agents (i, X(i)) buy both contracts (d, d′) (see the game in Figure 3, then in
equilibrium (ei, eX(i)) = (b, b).
< Figure 3 >
Similarly, it can be shown that if only agent i buys both contracts (d, d′), while
agent X(i) buys d, then in equilibrium (ei, eX(i)) = (a, b). If only agent X(i) buys both
contracts (d, d′), while agent i buys d, then in equilibrium (ei, eX(i)) = (b, a).
The portfolio choice is determined by the Nash equilibrium of the following game:
< Figure 4 >
Hence both agents (i, X(i)) buy both contracts (d, d′) and play (ei, eX(i)) = (b, b) (note
that in equilibrium the intermediary issuing contract d′ has zero profits). ♦
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